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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

DAVID F. OAKES, M.D.,
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant,
V.

BOISE HEART CLINIC PHYSICIANS,
PLLC,
Defendant-CounterclaimantRespondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION
REGARDING ADDITION TO THE
CLERK'S.RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 38146-2010
Ada County Docket No. 2009-15341

A STIPULATION REGARDING ADDITION TO THE CLERK'S RECORD was filed
counsel for Respondent on February 9, 2011. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION REGARDING ADDITION TOT
CLERK'S RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and upon receipt of the Clerk's Record
Appeal, the file stamped copies of the document which accompanied this Stipulation shall
inserted into the Record on Appeal:
l. Bench Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict, file-stam
September 21, 2010 .

. A.it

DATED this _b__ day of February 2011.

For the Supreme Court

cc: Counsel of Record
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A STIPULATION REGARDING ADDITION TO THE CLERK'S RECORD was filed by
counsel for Respondent on February 9, 2011. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION REGARDil\JG ADDITION TO THE
CLERK'S RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and upon receipt of the Clerk's Record on
Appeal, the file stamped copies of the document which accompanied this Stipulation shall be
inserted into the Record on Appeal:
1. Bench Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict, file-stamped
September 21, 2010.
DATED this

i4~ day of February 2011.
For the Supreme Court

cc: Counsel of Record

ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION REGARDING ADDITION TO THE CLERK'S RECORD
-Docket No. 38146-2010
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HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585
W \4\4-538\TRIAL\Directed Verdict-HFOB Bench Brief.doc

Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
DAVID F. OAKES, M.D.,
Case No. CV OC 0915341
P laintiff/Counterdefendant,
BENCH BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT

vs.
BOISE HEART CLINIC PHYSICIANS, PLLC,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

COMES NOW defendant Boise Heart Clinic, PLLC ("Boise Heart Clinic"), by and
through its undersigned counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and hereby
submits this bench brief in Support of Defendant's in-court Motion for a directed verdict
pursuant to IRCP 50(a).
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I.

SUMMARY

Plaintiff Dr. David Oakes has failed to support by substantial evidence his claims for
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Idaho Wage Claim
Act, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, and conversion. Boise Heart Clinic respectfully
moves for a directed verdict on these claims.
II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Standard on a Motion for Directed Verdict

A motion for directed verdict may be granted so long as there is not substantial evidence
to justify submitting the case to the jury. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41
(1984). Rule 50(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides a party may move for a
directed verdict "at the close of evidence offered by an opponent," and requires that the moving
party state the specific grounds for the motion. See I.R.C.P. 50(a); see also Idaho Trial

Handbook, § 28:2 (2d ed.).
When deciding a motion for directed verdict, the trial court applies a substantial evidence
test. Thus, the trial court "must determine whether, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence
and drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing party, there exists
substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury." Powers v. Honda Motor

Company, 139 Idaho 333, 335, 79 P.3d 154, 156 (2003) (citations omitted); Idaho Trial
Handbook § 28:2 ("For purposes of that determination, the moving party admits the truth of the
opponent's evidence and every favorable inference which may legitimately be drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the opponent") (citing Stephens v. Sterns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d
41(1984)).
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"The "substantial evidence" test does not require the (opposing party's] evidence to be
[direct or] uncontradicted. It requires only that the evidence be of sufficient quantity and
probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the party against
whom the motion is made is proper." Powers, supra (citations omitted). Instead, "substantial
evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.'" Elce v. State of Idaho and Western Const., Inc., 110 Idaho 361,363, 716 P.2d 505,
507 (1986). However, a verdict cannot be based upon speculation or conjecture, and, therefore, a
party opposing a motion for a directed verdict cannot rely on speculation or conjecture to supply
an essential element of proof to support submission of its claim to the jury. Id.
B.

Grounds for Dr. Oakes's Failure to Establish Substantial Evidence in
Support of His Claims

Dr. Oakes claims that Boise Heart Clinic breached a contract under which he is owed
Gainshare proceeds by failing to pay him those proceeds. However, Dr. O~es is not entitled to
the Gainshare proceeds he is claiming pursuant to either his employment contract or the
Gainshare agreement, and thus Boise Heart Clinic cannot be said to have committed a breach for
not paying him those proceeds. Furthermore, with no contract entitling him to the Gainshare
proceeds he is seeking, failure to pay such proceeds cannot amount to a failure to pay a wage
under Idaho law. Correspondingly, the existence of a valid contract prevents a claim for the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for unjust enrichment.

His claim of

conversion must similarly fail based on the contract language regarding the adjustments to
accounts receivable and the lack of entitlement to the assets of the Boise Heart Clinic under the
contract.
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I.

Failure of the Breach of Contract Claim

Dr. Oakes has failed to establish a breach of contract claim because neither of the
contracts at issue entitles him to the Gainshare proceeds.

A plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing the existence of a contract and the fact of its breach. 0 'Dell v. Basabe, et al., 119
Idaho 796,810 P.2d 1082 (1991). When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its
interpretation and legal effect are questions of law. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC,
141 Idaho 185, 108 P.3d 332, 337 (2005).

In Bakker, the plaintiff made contractual and

statutory claims for wages, and for quantum meruit based on language set out in her employment
agreement regarding how and when compensation would be paid:
Your compensation will be $3500 per month paid semi-monthly at
$1750 per period. You will also be paid .25% of 1% override on
all successful closings of escrow on units at Thunder Spring. This
begins as of your first day of employment estimated to be on or
about December 30, 2001. This includes all transactions written
inside or outside the sales venue, and will be in effect until all units
at Thunder Spring close escrow. This will not be applicable for
units previously disclosed by the developer or those in a holdover
period with McCann Daech Fenton. Further, this is in affect (sic)
only during your term of employment with ... Thunder Spring. :

Id. at 337-338. The Court held that this language, and thus the contract, was unambiguous in
referring to the entire compensation package, both the monthly wage and the earning of
commissions. Id. at 338.
Based on testimony, Dr. Oakes was an employee, not owner, subject to an employment
contract with the Boise Heart Clinic, which was negotiable, reviewed, and executed on an annual
basis. He testified he would have participated in Gainshare "regardless of whether [he] made a
dime." Moreover, he admitted in his Complaint and in his deposition that Gainshare was not
covered in his employment contract with the Boise Heart Clinic. See Complaint at ,I 9; Exh. 193,
63:2-5. Dr. Oakes admitted in his deposition there was no written contract between himself and
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the Boise Heart Clinic regarding Gainshare proceeds. Id., 62: 19-63: I 0. To the extent that Dr.
Oakes might argue that a motion for a directed verdict is inappropriate because his testimony at
trial with respect to the two contracts differed from his deposition testimony, such argument is
unpersuasive.

A party cannot survive a motion for a directed verdict by attempting to

manufacture substantial evidence of his claim. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
puts it,
"a party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting
his prior deposition testimony." Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co.,
952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir.1991) ... Cf Combs v. Rockwell lnt'l
Corp., 927 F.2d 486, 488-89 (9th Cir.1991) (dismissing with
prejudice and granting Rule 11 sanctions against a party and its
counsel because the attorney, in an effort to avoid summary
judgment, made substantive changes to the party's deposition
testimony in violation of FRCP 30(e)) ... ; Thorn v. Sundstrand
Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir.2000) ("We also
believe, by analogy to the cases which hold that a subsequent
affidavit may not be used to contradict the witness's deposition,
that a change of substance which actually contr~dicts the transcript
is impermissible unless it can plausibly be represented as the
correction of an error in transcription, such as dropping a 'not."')
(citations omitted).

Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enterprises, Inc., 397 F .3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir._2005).
The Gainshare Agreement defines "Group" as the Boise Heart Clinic, and sets out that St.
Luke's will pay the Group an amount of money based on the cost savings generated.

Defendant's Exhibits 105 and 106. Moreover, critical language of the Gainshare Agreement
spells out the discretionary nature of how the Group may handle the income it receives, and how
St. Luke's would have no liability associated with how the Group treated that income:
4. (d) Physicians will participate in the Program only through
participation in the Group. Participation [sic] Physicians shall be
compensated by each Group's sole discretion and St. Luke's shall
have no liability to individual Participating Physicians relating to
payment hereunder.
Id The Gainshare Agreement unambiguously provides for payment to the Group (Boise Heart
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Clinic) and allows the Group discretion on what to do with the payment. Dr. Oakes cannot
overcome that clear language or the similarly clear language limiting St. Luke's liability in this
scenario. 1
Dr. Oakes remams bound by his employment contract with the Boise Heart Clinic.
Paragraph 5, Accounting Required, clarified that "all income generated by the Physician for his
services as a Physician, shall belong to the Company."

Defendant's Exhibit 101. Under

paragraph 14, Relationship Between the Parties, language was set out that "nothing in the
contract shall be construed to give the Physician any interest in the tangible or intangible assets
of the Company." Id. An integration clause, paragraph 19, clarified, consistent with Dr. Oakes's
testimony, that the employment agreement represented the entire agreement between th~ parties
with respect to the subject, which included the compensation set out in paragraph 3. Id. This
employment agreement is the only contract that could bind Boise Heart Clinic with respect to
payment of compensation to Dr. Oakes and Dr. Oakes agreed it does not cover Gainshare
payments to him.
Dr. Oakes does allege that Boise Heart Clinic made representations to him, extrinsic to
both contracts, that he would get the portion of the Gainshare money that he is now seeking. To
the extent that such alleged promises were made before the contracts came into effect, they were
merged into the contracts. Both the employment and Gainshare agreements contain merger
clauses. Defendant's Exhibits 101, at

~

19; 105 and 106 at

~

22. Similarly, to the extent any

such alleged promises were made after the contracts took effect, they would have constituted
modifications to the agreements, which, according to the merger clauses, would have needed to
have been in writing and signed by the parties, and would also have had to have been supported
by new consideration. Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731,639 P.2d 429 (1981) (holding that
1

St Luke's is obviously not a party to this suit.

BENCH BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT - 6

consideration is required for modification, citing Dashnea v. Panhandle Lumber Co. Ltd., 57
Idaho 232, 64 P.2d 390 (1937); Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 275 Or. 567, 551 P.2d
1288 (1976)). Dr. Oakes has presented no evidence that he offered any additional consideration
in exchange for any modifications to the existing contracts. Dr. Oakes testified that he signed no
contract modifying his employment agreement and made no request to modify it.
Finally, to the extent that Dr. Oak es may allege that an implied contract regarding
Gainshare entitled him to monies he is seeking, that claim must also fail, due to the fact that there
is an express agreement covering Gainshare.
Because Dr. Oakes has failed to establish by substantial evidence a breach of contract
claim, a directed verdict must be entered on this claim and the claim must not be sent to the jury.
2.

Failure of the Idaho Wage Claim Act Claim

Because the employment contract did not cover Gainshare, Dr. Oakes cannot establish an
Idaho Wage Claim Act violation, as such a claim is inherently tied to the contract for
compensation. Dr. Oakes testified he was not contending that he was not paid for services under
his employment contract regarding Gainshare, as he was fully paid for those services. Again,
Gainshare is based on cost savings associated with products, not with services. Dr. Oakes also
testified that he was not claiming that the Boise Heart Clinic failed to pay him wages under his
employment contract.
The Supreme Court has held that when a plaintiff in a case fails to establish that amounts
in dispute were actually due from his employer because no contract provision covering that
matter was ever finalized, the plaintiffs statutory wage claim was appropriately dismissed. Gray

v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 210 P.3d 63, 70 (2009). Similarly, in Bakker v.
Thunder Spring-Wareham, where the plaintiffs employment contract was clear and
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unambiguous and her commissions complied with general rules governmg the earnings of
commissions by a broker, the Supreme Court concluded that any other terms associated with her
wages would be found in and determined by the terms of the employment agreement negotiated
between the parties. Bakker, supra, 108 P.3d at 336-37. Dr. Oakes agrees Gainshare monies
were not mentioned, nor were they covered, by the employment agreement. As such, Dr. Oakes'
wage claim must fail.
Moreover, the nature of Gainshare savings is antithetical to a wage claim. The principle
behind wage laws has to do with the fact that the "average wage earner depends greatly on the
regular receipt of earned wages.

If unpaid, serious economic injury may result to the wage

earner." Goff v. HJ.H Co., 95 Idaho 83 7 (1974). This principle was supp9rted, for example, by
the holding in Bi/ow v. Preco, Inc., 132 Idaho 23, 966 P.2d 23 (1998). In that case, the employee
bought a wage claim for unpaid deferred incentive compensation due to him under his contract.

Id. at 25, 966 P.2d at 25. The employment agreement precisely defined the parameters of the
deferred compensation, which consisted of
6.25% of Preco's monthly "pre-tax profit" as defined in the
agreement. Preco paid out 20% of the 6.25% each month (or
1.25% of Preco's monthly "pre-tax profit") as a "current incentive
compensation payment" for that month. The remaining 80% (or
5% of Preco's "pre-tax profit") was allocated to a deferral account.
The amount allocated to the deferral account was to be paid to
Bilow over a rolling four-year period, with 1148th of the account
balance being paid each month, beginning in January of
1990. FN2The purpose of the incentive compensation plan was to
average Bilow's income over a four-year period.
FN2. The agreement explained a monthly payout in the following
fashion:
For example, in the event that Bilow has been an employee of
Preco pursuant to this Agreement through the month of January of
1990, Bilow shall be paid as incentive compensation for the month
of January 1990 any positive totaJ of the following positive and/or
negative amounts: (a) 1.25% of the January 1990 Preco "pre-tax
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profit," (b) 1148th of 5% of the 1989 Preco "pre-tax profit" from
the Bilow "deferral account," (c) 1148th of 5% of the 1988 Preco
"pre-tax profit" from the Bilow "deferral account," (d) 1148th of
5% of the 1987 Preco "pre-tax profit" from the Bilow "deferral
account," and (e) 1148th of 5% of the I 986 Preco "pre-tax profit"
from the Bilow "deferral account."
Id at 26, 966 P.2d at 26. The Court held that the deferred compensation monies constituted

"wages" under Idaho wage law, and quoted the district court's analysis:
Bilow earned, as payment for services rendered over the
course of seven years, the balance of the funds in the deferral
account. They were part and parcel of his incentive compensation
agreement, and were paid out over a rolling four year period.
These funds represent compensation paid in direct consideration of
services rendered, over and above Bilow's "regular paychecks"
Id at 29, 966 P.2d at 29. The deferred compensation in this case was directly related to Bilow's

services and was properly understood as compensation falling within the definition of a "wage."
By contrast, the only parameter of Gainshare savings that might have been paid to Dr.

.
Oakes that is defined anywhere in writing states that the payment of Gainshare proceeds is
discretionary.

Defendant's Exhibits 105 and 106 at

,r

4.d.

Gainshare savings were not tied

directly to Dr. Oakes' performance; indeed, it was the group, rather than the individual, that
participated in Gainshare. For example, Exhibit "C" of the Gainshare agreements (Defendant's
Exhibits I 05 and I 06) provides that "[ n]otwithstanding the following, no payment shall be made
in the event that Group's utiliz.ation of the Cost Savings Items is less than the recommended
minimum utiliz.ation of such items .... " In other words, if Boise Heart Clinic as a Group failed
to use enough of the cost saving items, the group would not get any Gainshare payout
whatsoever, regardless of whether Dr. Oakes did everything he could to help the Group meet the
minimum requirements.
Also in contrast to the compensation in Bi/ow, there was further uncertainty regarding
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any payout to physicians under the Gainshare program due to a termination clause. On page 13,
~

15, the Gainshare agreement states that "any party may terminate this Agreement with or

without cause at any time by giving the other party written notice of such intention at least thirty
(30) days prior to such termination.

Upon expiration of the [one year] term or sooner

termination of this Agreement (the "Termination Date"), all obligations of the parties to each
other hereunder shall cease .... " Defendant's Exhibits I 05 and 106. Had St. Luke's or Boise
Heart Clinic or Goodroe terminated the Gainshare agreement before payment (if any) from St.
Luke's to Boise Heart Clinic was made, St. Luke's obligation, if any, to pay Boise Heart Clinic
would have ceased. Stated another way, there was no contractual guarantee that Boise Heart
Clinic would receive money that it could then, at its sole di~cretion, attribute to Dr. Oakes for
this outside program.
3.

Failure of the Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing protects the rights of parties to receive
benefits of an employment agreement that they have entered. Parker v. Boise Telco Fed. Credit
Union, 129 Idaho 248, 923 P.2d 493 (1996). That is, only denial of a benefit to which the
employee was entitled under the terms of the employment agreement will support a claim for
breach of this covenant. Id. The covenant does not inject substantive terms into a contract, but
requires only that the parties perform in good faith the obligations imposed by their agreement.
Id.
No covenant will be implied which is contrary to the terms of the
contract negotiated and executed by the parties. The covenant
requires "that the parties perform in good faith the obligations
imposed by their agreement," and a violation of the covenant
occurs only when "either party . . . violates, nullifies or
significantly impairs any benefit of the ... contract .... "
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Idaho First Natl. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 288, 824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991)
(citations omitted).
Because Dr. Oakes has admitted in this lawsuit that his employment contract did not
cover Gainshare proceeds, he cannot recover under the breach of contract or a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory as it relates to that contract. As such, Dr. Oakes
has also failed to establish substantial evidence of a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
4.

Failure of the Claim for Unjust Enrichment

Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract implied at
law. Barry v. Pacific West Coast, Inc., 140 Idaho 827; 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004). These claims
are not established when there is an express contract governing the relationships of the parties.

Wolfordv. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 695 P.2d 1201 (1984) (emphasis added).

However, an

equitable remedy may be found even when an express contract exists if the contract is unlawful,
unconscionable, or violates public policy. US. Bank Nat. Ass 'n v. Kuenzli, I 34 Idaho 222, 999
P.2d 877 (2000). Whether a contract violates public policy is a question of law for the court to
determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case. Quiring v. Quiring, l 30 Idaho 560,
944 P.2d 695, 70 I (1997). Public policy may be found in statutes, judicial decisions, or the
constitution. Id. Notably, as a matter of public policy, nothing in the Idaho Wage Claim Act
places limits on the ability of the employer and employee to contract for the terms of the
employee's compensation. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 108 P.3d
332, 337 (2005). As long as the employer is meeting the minimum wage requirements of state
law, further compensation is subject to negotiation between the employer and employee. Id.
Correspondingly, for a contract to be voided as unconscionable, it must be both procedurally and
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substantively unconscionable. Id. at 338., citing Lavey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 139
Idaho 37, 72 P.3d 877 (2003)(citing cases).

"Procedural unconscionability relates to the

bargaining process leading to the agreement while substantive unconscionability focuses on the
terms of the agreement itself." Id.

It is not sufficient that the contractual provisions appear

unwise or their enforcement seems harsh. Id. Whether a contractual term is unconscionable is
also a matter of law. Id.
Here, a claim for unjust enrichment has not been supported by any evidence, let alone
substantial evidence, because an employment contract governs the relationship of the parties.
Additionally, such a claim cannot be made in the absence of claims in this case that the contracts
at issue were unlawful, unconscionable, or vinlated public policy.

No evidence has been

admitted on such an allegation.
As such, a motion for directed verdict is appropriate on this claim.
5.

Failure of the Claim for Conversion

A claim for conversion requires: 1) that the defendant exercised dominion and control
over plaintiff's items of property without a right to do so, 2) that the plaintiff was consequently
deprived of possession of those items of property, and 3) that the plaintiff was damaged. Peasley
Transfer & Storage Co., 132 Idaho 732, 979 P.2d 605 (1999). Under the express terms of Dr.
Oakes's employment contract, paragraph 14, he had no right as an employee to any assets of the
Boise Heart Clinic. Dr. Oakes testified that the contract specifically stated he had no interest in
the tangible or intangible assets of the Boise Heart Clinic. The amount earned under the contract
with St. Luke's was income to and an asset of the Boise Heart Clinic to which he had no
entitlement (and such amount was "comingled" in Boise Heart's account with other Boise Heart
income).

Nor did anything in the Gainshare Agreement establish his right to any of the
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payments made under the terms of that contract with the Boise Heart Clinic. That is, Dr. Oakes
cannot and did not establish a property right or a deprivation in this circumstance.
Based on this failure, this claim too must be subject to a directed verdict.

Ill.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing specific failures to establish substantial evidence on these claims,
the Boise Heart Clinic respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion for Directed Verdict.
DATED this

2.1_ day of September, 2010.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.

Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

_2j_

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of September, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:
Thomas A. Banducci
Dara Labrum
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
PLLC
802 West Bannock, Ste. 500
Boise, Idaho 83702

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Fax No. 342-4455
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